

GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS

1. Overall objective (US and GVN)
2. Roles and missions for GVN forces
3. Roles and missions for civic action cadres
4. Intelligence
5. Coordination of the military and civil effort (US and GVN)
6. Vietnamese participation in pacification
7. Direction from the top
8. Single US concept -- action level body for interagency coordination
9. Relationship between the GVN military and the population
10. Psychological exploitation of GVN successes and VC weaknesses --  
paywar and civic action
11. Pacification versus military and civil operations
12. Chieu Hoi and VC prisoners
13. Minority groups and religious groups
14. Hop tac
15. Orientation of the US effort (paper work)
16. Troop strength and available forces to district province chiefs

Complete political/economic/military coordination plan.

Resources, authority, will (by Province Chief) to act on intelligence w.r.t. VC infrastructure. March: Province Chief doesn't know what to do; is afraid of being accused of being a lackey.

[What do we want/expect to be done to the infrastructure? What does it mean to "root out," "destroy" the infrastructure? Kill them; arrest them; put them in stocks; publicly identify them?

Tasks: 1) provide moral security ("destroy" infrastructure?): local positive commitment.  
2) destroy VC forces provide  
3) prevent infiltration & support.

[CAN US BE RELIED ON? (a) For providing good, integrated advice?  
b) For providing adequate, lasting support, pressure, attention?]



# mitigating Failures

Washington  
direction,  
coord,  
needed?

1. Failure to provide <sup>lasting</sup> security to the rural population.
  - a) failure to provide protection from VC attacks over long, continuous periods.
  - b) failure to "destroy/neutralize" VC infrastructure (identify; meet?).
  - c) failure to secure provisional commitment.
2. Failure to plan the political/social aspects of pacification
  - on US Conty Team basis (US?)
3. Failure of USOM/MACV to coordinate; CT to provide integrated <sup>CAS?</sup> direction. ("Failure")
4. Failure to involve GVN in planning on integrated basis.
5. Failure to secure positive popular commitment to the GVN.   
Broken promise

[ "We would to have a concept: the strategic hamlet program." ]  
a vehicle for coordination.

[ Fully if security needed: people need to know their protection and forces are present and that forces will fight effectively ]

## Uncertainties/Controversies:

1. US influence through GVN/Saigon or work with/through Provincials?
2. Rely on Army/const police or on "arming population"?
3. Use of Army to: a) secure/destroy infrastructure  
b) win people.

CAS strategy: "work with the people."  
Villages, hamlets

State (Chelund): work with Provincial Chiefs

OOD: work with GVN (+ integrate US effort)

- [ Is it: SVN war?  
GVN/Saigon war?  
people's (provincials, villages) war?  
ARVN war?  
Police/aid force? ]

CAS: "People must protect themselves" [ Why? Since when do citizens have to protect themselves? ]

[ Hope: "people" wait out to protect themselves unless help will be on the way quickly; at most, they will protect themselves till help comes. ]

Army Civilian Action ~~is~~ includes "non-sabotage": taking food & water without paying, "building fires near fruit trees and killing the ants."

What do SVNers want?

1. "Justice"
2. Self-determination

Don't want "democracy" in the sense of total responsibility

Don't want centralized control by "foreigners": even when there was security within a hamlet, there was no better security between hamlets or commitment by people.